İsrail Ordusu'nun eski istihbarat direktörü ve şimdi de en önde gelen düşünçe kuruluşlarından INSS'in Başkanı olan Amos Yadlin ülkesinin kuzey ve güneyindeki güvenlik durumunu tahlil ettiği son yazısında İsrailli karar alıcılar için askeri güç kullanımı öncesinde cevaplanması, hakkında düşünülmesi ve hazırlık yapılması gerektiğini düşündüğü 10 maddelik bir çerçeve ve check-liste yer veriyor. Yaının hedef kitlesi İsrail güvelik eliti olmakla beraber, son aylarda askeri güç kullanımına yakın zamana kadar görülenin çok ötesinde istek ve belki de ihtiyaç duyan Türkiyeli karar alıcılar da bu pasajı kesip odalarında her zaman görebilecekleri bir yerde tutarlarsa faydasını görebilirler.
"...before entering into military confrontation in the south or in the north, the political leadership and the IDF must study and clarify the following strategic and tactical issues:
1. What strategic purpose does Israel seek to achieve, and what are the implications of each alternative?
2. What is the main leverage for achieving this goal – directly or indirectly? Does it include attacks on the enemy’s national infrastructure supporting its military efforts?
3. How can the operation be shortened, and what are the mechanisms to terminate it?
4. How will the political campaign be conducted at the international and regional level? In this context: will international and regional actors intervene (threats, sanctions, or even military involvement)? When will international and regional actors demand an end to the operation? When and how will negotiations take place about Security Council decisions, if at all? How can international and regional actors be used to shorten the operation and achieve its goals?
5. What is the correct timing of the operation? Can a preemptive strike be conducted, or at least can tactical surprises be created that could lead to significant achievements at the outset?
6. What is the quality and level of Israel's intelligence about the capabilities and intentions of the enemy? In this context, what is different now from the previous campaign? Where and how will Israel be surprised? On what issues could planning reflect incorrect intelligence, or operational or political conceptions?
7. Does the operation include ground maneuvers, and if so, to what purpose? What is the proper timing and depth? Should Israel prepare for occupation or a temporary presence?
8. How will Israel conduct targeted attacks of the organization’s leaders? What capabilities are required and what will be the impact of these actions?
9. How should the Israeli civilian arena be prepared for the campaign? Can the public’s expectations be managed? How? What is the level of resilience level of the home front?
10. What are the risks that a second front could be opened simultaneously, and how can this possibility be prepared for?"
Amos Yadlin, "Deterrence, Miscalculation, and the Next Round," INSS Insight No. 863, 19 Ekim, 2016. http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12443
